

**INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AGREEMENTS:
Overlap With Current Trends in Arms Control Negotiations**

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The current trend in treaty negotiation is tending toward multinational conventions with international verification and arbitration. Many of these agreements have produced an environmental sampling and analysis regime to aid in overall verification and compliance determinations. This has been especially true in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) where both onsite and offsite analysis for key chemicals of interest will play an important role in both routine and challenge inspections. The IAEA has begun exploring the potential of a wider environmental sampling regime in support of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is due largely to public and political pressures as a result of the lessons learned from Iraq and the hope that such a situation may be avoided and/or better predicted in the future. Finally, recent discussions in conjunction with the Open Skies Agreement have now broadened to environmental monitoring and what might be gained by such an effort in an overt and cooperative context.

With the changing demographics internationally and the emphasis on more open economic exchanges, global monitoring and international environmental protection have become key issues to policy makers. The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992 was strong evidence of this. Many of the trade agreements presently under negotiation give evidence that the overwhelming concern for environmental controls and protection has sparked an interest in establishing some type of bilateral or multilateral protection. Additionally, the U.S. has several collaborative efforts underway, focused on environmental problems related to previous production and/or testing of nuclear weapons as a result of the recent access to the Former Soviet Union. However, to date signed environmental agreements and conventions have not yet been implemented. The actual mechanism for implementation and compliance has not been determined, although it has been suggested that the World Court and/or the UN Environment Program (UNEP) might serve as the lead verification organization. This paper discusses the specific inspection and verification protocols of recent Arms Control negotiations and how they may be applied to Environmental Agreements. In particular, the CWC is used as a model for an Inspectorate Organization which would have the responsibility to be the gatekeeper for compliance monitoring. Environmental concerns related to both chemical and

nuclear facilities and many of the issues of routine and nonroutine inspections and subsequent verification are applicable to already existing arms control agreements and protocols.

To emphasize the importance of implementing these environmental agreements, we refer to the existing situation with respect to the newly instituted North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Negotiations between Canada, the United States, and Mexico have highlighted a common concern regarding the environmental implications of increased trade. The 2000 miles of shared border between the U.S. and Mexico has become the focus of much of the environmental debate. Improving NAFTA policy to incorporate an agenda of sustainable development was recently negotiated in the Environmental Side Agreement. The side agreement is viewed as a crucial vehicle for assuring that environmental protection is addressed to the mutual benefit of the U.S. and Mexico. However, implementation of this agreement remains unclear and protocols for establishing verification and confidence-building have not yet been discussed and/or planned for. Encouragement and assistance by the U.S. in the negotiation of protocols for the implementation of this and other environmental agreements could build confidence among countries and lead to a lessening of potential local and regional tensions.

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